During our exploration of one of the saddest texts from ancient Mesopotamia, the Assyrian Elegy, we noticed that people in Mesopotamia might have good reasons to fear death. Because their ideas about the Netherworld that awaited them were mostly bleak. In our current era we may encounter many religions that offer the possibility of a happier afterlife, and there are also a lot of persons who do not presume that there is an existence after death at all. Most of us, however, still do not look forward to dying, thank you very much.¹ And the accompanying fear of death has created a lot of beautiful artworks as well as philosophical treatises. In this blog, I aim to share with you the insights from a few of the latter, which were written by Thomas Nagel and Martha Nussbaum.

I shall first elaborate and comment on the reasons that Nagel gives in his famous 1970 essay Death for the more or less ubiquitous fear in human societies of the evil that is death.² Then I will reflect on the work of Martha Nussbaum as one possible way in which we could negate, to an extent, those reasons given for why we fear death.³ But we do end on a happy note: even with those negations in place there would still not be a proper preparation for death!

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Thomas Nagel and Death

Nagel’s essay on death is, perhaps paradoxically, very lively written. In his footnotes, he even seems to anticipate the popular meme “would you love me if I was a worm?”, when he brings up a thought experiment about humans growing from spores.⁴ And it is life that, in Nagel’s view, makes us fear death. Death is feared, he postulates, because it is an evil. And it is an evil, because it deprives us of something – of life. But surely, it is not merely the loss of life that makes death so terrifying? What about the loss of joy, happiness, and other amenities? Well, according to Nagel, it is. As even a life filled with misery is categorically different than the alternative of simply not existing at all. It is about the experience of life that is lost, and any good times are just icing on the cake.⁵ To be robbed of life is a tragedy, but to linger in a state of death is not. The Babylonian king Ḫammurabi has certainly not suffered more than Julius Caesar, just because he has been dead for roughly 1700 more years than that famous Roman?⁶

One could bring a number of objections against this reasoning and Nagel replies to some of them in his essay. He refutes the first objection, that one cannot possibly know what one loses by being dead, outright.⁷ Many evil things can happen to a person without them ever noticing, but they would still be unfortunate. I am misled and bereft of a reader, even if I never find out that my neighbor did indeed consistently lie about reading my blog weekly! But the more important point that Nagel makes, is that the loss of possibilities is indeed that, a veritable loss. It is all about the contrast between the experienced reality and what could have been.⁸ A person that died, was not predestined to leave this mortal coil when they did. And they could have lived and possessed the good that is life – in the sense of the thing that is lost in death – for a little while longer hadn’t that happened, whether they died at 30 or 80 years old. Even dying when one has lived close to a 1000 years would still be a tragedy. It does not matter that this lifespan is outside of the normal expectations for human beings, the loss of possible experiences is still there.⁹  

Lastly, Nagel addresses those commentators who remark that the state of death is comparable to not being born and therefore being non-existent. That latter is not considered an evil or a loss, is it?¹⁰ When one is not yet born, Nagel replies, there is also not yet a subject who can suffer the loss of one’s life. And here is where the spores come in!¹¹ Because, if humans were grown from spores that could, through some miracle, be hatched years earlier than they would otherwise have, these persons still would have never known who they could have been if the spores, from which they sprung, had matured in their own time. Because, I would add, our circumstances perhaps determine as much who we are, as our bodies.¹² That is why we fear death and not non-existence. Death represents a loss, and having been born in another time or place is simply an unknown. Even worse, even a different existence in another time or place would, as far as we can see at the moment, still entail that ultimate loss eventually.

Martha Nussbaum and Capabilities

Nussbaum, who writes about classics in addition to philosophy, has had ample to say about Nagel’s views on death, and I have cited some of her scholarship above.¹³ For now I want to leave these remarks aside, though, and focus on her version of the so-called capabilities approach.¹⁴ Because, if death is a loss of possibilities, this capabilities approach is perhaps a fruitful way to think about how we might provide every person with the most pertinent possibilities before they – sooner or later – croak.

And Nussbaum, in her extended bibliography, argues that some of those possibilities are more pertinent than others.¹⁵ She therefore proposes that every human being should be able to explore certain capabilities during their lifetime, so that their life may be called worthy of human dignity.¹⁶ One might even compile a list of these capabilities. Such a list would include, among other items, an existence that is as painless as possible, the development of one’s talents, and the cultivation of social relationships on an equal footing with others.¹⁷ These capabilities, in Nussbaum’s view, constitute a hard lower limit, which no human being should miss out on.¹⁸ And we can compile such a list, because we are all human beings that all share a vulnerability to time and wound, thirst and hunger, and – ultimately – death. In fact, “not dying prematurely” is one of the very capabilities that Nussbaum proposes!¹⁹

These capabilities can be related to Nagel’s idea that death is primarily the loss of life in two ways, I think. In the first place, Nussbaum’s capabilities appear to be intimately connected to how and why we die. The capabilities that have to do with the human body, such as access to food and shelter, are obviously particularly relevant.²⁰ But many of the capabilities that go beyond our own selves and concern, for example, our connections with other people are also important in this regard. And this Nussbaum candidly explains through ancient mythology – including cyclopes! – and one self-invented, modern fable about the cheekily titled planet Textualité.²¹ But, long story short, these capabilities might help us to postpone, as long as possible, the loss that accompanies death. In the second place, there is the time pressure. None of us knows how long we have – especially when we live in a municipality without proper bicycle lanes or with trams! – and Nussbaum’s capabilities bring into focus what possibilities we lose when our time on earth ends. As such, we have some sort of guidance regarding what we might do with our life, for as long as we are not dispossessed of it. And perhaps she is right, that the most important thing that we can do – whether we are mythological heroes, live on ironically named planets, or are simply little old us – is be compassionate with others.²² Because our fellow humans are, in the end, just as vulnerable to the cold touch of the grim reaper as we are, after all.

Conclusion: There Is No Cheating the Reaper

However we think about the daunting prospect of death and what its current inevitability means for our life plans – even if we would succeed in fashioning everyone with Nussbaum’s proposed capabilities during their lifetimes, regardless of the length of those lifetimes or the lack thereof – that prosect and this inevitability remain for now. And as Steven Luper notes at the end of his own essay on the subject for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: there is no proper preparation for death. We cannot defang it, remove its claws, or make it otherwise harmless. Even if we forsake the capabilities approach and go entirely the other way. When we would instead forego any and all aspirations that could be thwarted by the grim reaper. Even in that situation we are still not out of their grasp – as they would now have precluded us from having such ambitions in the first place!²³

Though this blog is far from the excellent digital resource on philosophy in which Luper wrote his insights, I hope that I have again left something of value behind this week, which might survive my own loss of life someday. And I plan to do the same thing next week!

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References

1. Thomas Nagel, “Death”, in: Steven M. Cahn & Peter Markie (ed.), Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 942.
2. Ibidem, p. 942-947.
3. I will refer primarily to: Martha C. Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism”, Political Theory 1992, 20 (2), p. 202-246.
4. Nagel, “Death”, p. 946-947, note 3; Amy Martin, “How the CSIRO Is Using Pop Culture to Redefine Science Communication”, Canberra Times January 23^th 2024, Local Government, p. 9.
5. Nagel, “Death”, p. 942-943.
6. Ibidem, p. 942-943; Marc van de Mieroop, Hammurabi of Babylon (London: I.B. Tauris & co, 2003), p. xiii; Frits Naerebout & Henk Singor, De Oudheid: Grieken en Romeinen in de Context van de Wereldgeschiedenis (Amsterdam: Ambo, 2010), p. 482. And I made you think of the Roman Empire, yet again!
7. Nagel, “Death”, p. 944; Martha C. Nussbaum, “The Damage of Death: Incomplete Arguments and False Consolations”, in: James Stacey Taylor (ed.), The Metaphysics and Ethics of Death: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 28; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), p. 201-202, note 8.
8. Nagel, “Death”, p. 945.
9. Ibidem, p. 946.
10. Ibidem, p. 945-946.
11. Ibidem, p. 946-947, note 3. See also: Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, p. 205-206.
12. Steven Luper, The Philosophy of Death (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 65; Peter M. Cahn & Christine Vitrano, Happiness and Goodness: Philosophical Reflections on Living Well (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), p 83; Nagel, “Death”, p. 945-946.
13. For a succinct overview, in which Nussbaum also evaluates her earlier stances on Nagel’s ideas, see: Nussbaum, “The Damage of Death”, p. 26-35.
14. The capabilities approach was pioneered by Amartya Sen and has been applied to a number of societal matters, from the plight of impaired persons to disaster relief, see: Ingrid Robeyns, “Het Rechtvaardigheidsdenken van Amartya Sen”, in: Amartya Sen, Het Idee van Rechtvaardigheid (Rotterdam: Lemniscaat, 2013), p. 13; Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice”, p. 234, Martha C. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2006); Andrew Crabtree, “Capabilities, Ethics and Disasters”, in: Dónal P. O’Mathúna, Vilius Dranseika & Bert Gordijn (eds.), Disasters: Core Concepts and Ethical Theories (Cham: Springer, 2018), p. 175-187.
15. Most influential in: Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice”, p. 202-246. But see also: Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice; Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
16. Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, p. 78.
17. Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice”, p. 214-229; Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, p. 76-78.
18. Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice”, p. 205, 214-15, 217-23; Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, p. 169-173.
19. Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice”, p. 222.
20. Ibidem, p. 217.
21. Ibidem, p. 222-223, 241-242.
22. Ibidem, p. 237-241.
23. Steven Luper, “Death”, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford: Stanford University, 2022), Plato.stanford.edu (consulted on February 27^th 2024). See also: Steven Luper, “Adaptation”, in: James Stacey Taylor (ed.), The Metaphysics and Ethics of Death: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 109-111.